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THE ARBITRABLE ISSUE: THE PROBLEM OF FRAUD
INTRODUCTION

At common law an executory agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable as
against public policy.' If the agreement was fully executed, however, the courts
would recognize and enforce it.2 With the passage of arbitration statutes in
most of the states, 3 this common law rule was altered so that such agreements
are now valid, enforceable and irrevocable "save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 4 Thus, generally speaking,
if in a specific performance action to compel arbitration an issue of fraud, duress
or misrepresentation is raised, the courts, before determining whether the
parties are to proceed to arbitration, must first decide that issue., A contract
to arbitrate is almost universally appended to the substantive contract to which
it relates.6 Consequently, the question is raised as to what precisely is meant
by the term "contract" as used in arbitration statutes. Is the term all inclusive, that is, does it encompass the substantive contract together with the
appended arbitration agreement or does it merely relate to the arbitration
agreement? If fraud is alleged as to the inducement for the substantive contract, must the court first decide that issue of fraud or is the court's jurisdiction
limited to allegations directed specifically to the arbitration agreement?
THE NEW

YORK RULE

In the Matter of Palmer & Pierce, Inc.,7 one of the earliest cases construing
the New York arbitration statute, the appellate division established what has
1. 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1433 (1951).
2. Merrit v. Thompson, 27 N.Y. 225 (1863).
3. Only South Dakota and Oklahoma currently do not have arbitration statutes.
4. The New York arbitration statute is contained in N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1448-69.
Section 1448 provides:
[T]wo or more persons may submit to the arbitration of one or more arbitrators any
controversy existing between them at the time of the submission which may be the subject
of an action, or they may contract to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
between them and such submission or contract shall be valid, enforceable and Irrevocable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract ....
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1450 provides in part:
A party aggrieved by the failure, neglect or refusal of another to perform under a contract
or submission providing for arbitration . . .may petition the supreme court, or a judge
thereof, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for
in such contract or submission .... The court, or a judge thereof, shall hear the parties
and upon being satisfied that there is no substantial issue as to the making of the contract
or submission or the failure to comply therewith . . . shall make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the contract or submission.
If evidentiary facts be set forth raising a substantial issue as to the making of the
contract or submission or the failure to comply therewith, the court, or the judge thereof,
shall proceed immediately to the trial thereof ...
5. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1450.
6. A contract to arbitrate is distinguishable from a submission. The latter term usually
designates an agreement to arbitrate an existing controversy. 3 Am. Jur. Arbitration and
Award § 15 (1936).
7. 195 App. Div. 523, 186 N.Y. Supp. 369 (1st Dep't 1931). See also In re General
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subsequently become the generally accepted rule where the existence or nonexistence of the agreement to arbitrate is in issue. The court held that it could
not compel specific performance of an arbitration agreement unless there was an
agreement to arbitrate, therefore, the question of whether the arbitration
agreement was in fact made had first to be determined by the court. The question of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or not is somewhat analogous
to the question of the fraudulent inducement of the agreement, since in the
latter case, if the innocent party seeks rescission, and fraud in the inducement
is shown, there is no contract ab initio.
In the controversial case of Czeney Bros. v. Joroco Dresses, Inc.,8 fraud was
pleaded as a defense to an action for specific performance of an arbitration
agreement. The appellate division, in a 3-to-2 decision, notwithstanding that
the fraud was alleged only against the substantive contract, held that "the
question as to whether or not the contract was fraudulently induced raises an
issue of fact which must be tried before the right to arbitration under the
contract may be enforced."* Under this reasoning, fraud as to the substantive
contract, if proved, invalidates the entire contract inclusive of the arbitration
clause. The Cheney rule for fraud raised as a defense has, until recently, been
generally followed in New York among the lower courts.10
At common law the defrauded party to a contract had an election of remedies
which were considered mutually exclusive." He could rescind the contract
and sue at law to recover the consideration paid. He could bring an action in
equity to rescind the contract and obtain full relief. Lastly, the innocent party
could keep what he had received under the contract and sue at law for
damages.' 2 In effect, this last remedy resulted in an affirmance of the contract.
In the Matter of Wrap-Vertiser Corp.'3 the defrauded party sought to have arbitrated his demand for damages based on fraud and breach of contract.' 4 The
Silk Importing Co., 200 App. Div. 786, 194 N.Y. Supp. 15 (Ist Dep't), aff'd, 234 N.Y.
513, 138 N.E. 427 (1922).
8. 218 App. Div. 652, 219 N.Y. Supp. 96 (Ist Dep't 1926), rev'd on other grounds, 245
N.Y. 375, 157 NE. 272 (1927).

9. Cheney Bros. v. Joroco Dresses, Inc., 218 App. Div. 652, 653, 219 N.Y. Supp. 95 (1st
Dep't 1926). However, the court of appeals, in reversing, unanimously held as a matter
of law that fraud was not established by the facts alleged. Cheney Bros. v. Joroco Dresses,
Inc., 245 N.Y. 375, 157 N.E. 272 (1927). The defendant merely made a general allegation

of fraud without setting forth evidentiary facts. The statute itself requires sufficient
evidentiary facts. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1450.
10. See, e.g., Manufacturers Chem. Co. v. Caswell, 259 App. Div. 321, 19 N.Y.52d
171 (1st Dep't), cert. denied, 283 N.Y. 679, 28 N.E.2d 404 (1940). The appellate division

held that if a misrepresentation alleged against the substantive contract were proven, no
arbitration could be had as the agreement to arbitrate would fall with the rest of the

contract. See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Dewitt Dev. Corp., 150
Misc. 408, 269 N.Y. Supp. 104 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
11. 37 CJ.S. Fraud § 65 (1943).
12. Goldsmith v. National Container Corp., 287 N.Y. 438, 40 N.E2d 242 (1942);
Vail v. Reynolds, 113 N.Y. 297, 23 N.E. 301 (1890).
13. 3 N.Y.2d 17, 143 N.E2d 366, 163 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1957).
14. Such a demand could now be made, even though at common law a suit for damages
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court of appeals, though holding that the arbitration clause was not broad
enough to encompass the issue of fraud,15 clearly recognized the innocent
party's right to arbitrate in view of his affirmance of the contract including
the arbitration agreement by his suit for damages. The decision is unique in
its preclusion of arbitration due to the particular wording of the arbitration
clause involved. 16
Whereas in Wrap-Vertiser the innocent party had sought arbitration, In the
Matter of Arnerotron Corp.'7 the alleged defrauding party, Amerotron, sought
and was granted, pending arbitration, a stay of the innocent party's court
action for damages. In confirming the arbitration award in favor of Amerotron,
the appellate division held that "by all of its actions respecting its claim of
fraud inducing the contract, including its complaint .. .respondent failed to
rescind the contract and elected to recognize the contract and claim damages
for fraud. Such a claim was arbitrable and should have been arbitrated under
the contract."' s The court of appeals affirmed without opinion. 10 Therefore,
it may be postulated that the New York courts are willing to permit arbitration
of fraud provided the innocent party affirms the contract and the arbitration
agreement is sufficiently broad to include the question of fraud.20 The WrapVertiser decision suggests that the arbitration clause in this regard will be
construed rather strictly.
The court of appeals, in the Wrap-Vertiser case, stated categorically in dicta
that if the innocent party were seeking rescission, none of his demands could
be arbitrated until the issue of the basis for rescission had been determined
by the courts 21 A consideration of recent New York lower court decisions
indicates that the rule as to rescission is being altered in favor of its determiwould not entitle the avoiding party to the return of his down payment. Goldsmith v.
National Container Corp., 287 N.Y. 438, 40 N.E.2d 242 (1942); Vail v. Reynolds, 118
N.Y. 297, 23 N.E. 301 (1890). The remedies for fraud have been altered in New York so
that the return of the down payment and a suit for damages are no longer inconsistent.
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 112-c.
15. In the Matter of Wrap-Vertiser Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 17, 19, 143 N.E.2d 366, 367, 163
N.Y.S.2d 639, 641 (1957).
16. The arbitration agreement provided for arbitration of any question as to the
"validity, interpretation or performance of this agreement." Id. at 20, 143 N.E.2d
at 367, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 641. The court, in interpreting the agreement, reasoned that
since the defrauded party was affirming the contract by the suit for damages, he could
not bring his demand for damages due to the fraud within the "validity" clause of the
agreement since the contract was now valid.
17. 3 App. Div. 2d 899, 162 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1st Dep't 1957), aff'd mem., 4 N.Y.2d 722,
148 N.E.2d 319, 171 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1958).
18. In the Matter of Amerotron Corp., 3 App. Div. 2d 899, 162 N.Y.S.2d 214, 215
(1st Dep't 1957).
19. In the Matter of Amerotron Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 722, 148 N.E.2d 319, 171 N.Y.S.2d
111 (1958).
20. See, e.g., Reo Garment, Inc. v. Jason Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 521, 170 N.Y.S.2d 412
(Sup. Ct. 1958).
21. 3 N.Y.2d at 19, 143 N.E.2d at 367, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 641.

1959-60]

COMMENTS

nation by arbitration. In Lugay Frocks, Inc. v. Joint Bd. Dressmakers'
Union,22 notwithstanding that the petitioner sought rescission, the court held
that so long as there was a signed contract in existence providing for arbitration the respondent had a right to demand arbitration. In the case of In re
East Meadow Sanitation Serv., Inc.2 3 the petitioner sought to stay arbitration
by raising fraud as a defense. The court held that arbitration could be had,
reasoning that the contract was valid when arbitration was sought, and only
after it was sought did the petitioner raise the vitiating defense of fraud.
The case presented generally the same factual situation as was involved in
the Chzey case, i.e., fraud raised as a defense to arbitration, and yet the court
arrived at a contrary result. The court's theory was apparently one of estoppel.
THmoxEs AND APPROACHMS
It is apparent that the problem of fraud and the arbitration agreement is
not static.24 The courts are struggling with a comparatively new problem.
Some of the reluctance to permit arbitrators to decide the issue of fraud in
the inducement of the substantive contract may be a vestige of the age-old
opposition of the courts to arbitration in general. Some of the fault conceivably
lies with the arbitration statutes themselves.
The avenues of approach to the problem of who shall decide the issue of
fraud are several and, to a certain extent, depend on the factual situation
involved. If fraud is alleged as to the arbitration agreement itself the courts
must determine the question. Then the issue is incontrovertibly presented as
to whether or not the agreement exists. On the other hand, it is logical to say
that under such a situation the innocent party could affirm the fraudulently
induced arbitration agreement and compel arbitration. It is also well settled,
an allegation that the contract is void, whether it is alleged as to the substantive contract, the arbitration clause or both, must be decided by the
courts.2 5 To have the arbitrators decide issues under a void contract would
be to give validity to the contract.
A more difficult question is the effect of an allegation of fraud as to the
substantive contract upon the arbitration agreement. To this problem there
are two possible solutions. First, it can be argued that the courts should decide
the issue of fraud. The decisions, however, do not fully uphold this approach.
Affirmation of the contract by the defrauded party gives the arbitrators juris22. N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1958, p. 3 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 6 App. Div. 2d 10m, 177 N.Y.S.2d
1003 (1st Dep't 1958).
23. N.Y.J., Feb. 25, 1958, p. 13 (Sup. Ct.).
24. The decisions of jurisdictions other than New York on the question of fraud and
arbitration agreements are few. See Maxwell Shapiro Wollen Co. v. Amerotron Corp., 158
N.E.2d 875 (Mass. 1959) (arbitration of fraud proper where damages are sought). See
also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Shapiro, 138 Conn. 57, 82 A.2d 345 (1951); Sommer v. Mackay, 10 N.J. Misc. 644, 160 Ad. 495 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
25. See Metro Plan, Inc. v. Miscione, 257 App. Div. 652, 15 N.YS.2d 35 (Ist Dep't
1939); In re Gale, 176 Misc. 277, 27 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 262 App. Div. 834, 28
N.Y.S.2d 270 (Ist Dep't 1941).
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diction provided it is within the scope of the arbitration clause. 20 This is not
the case where rescission is sought. Whether the approach to be employed
should be divergent depending on the remedy sought by the innocent party is
doubtful, particularly in a jurisdiction like New York where damages and
rescission are not inconsistent. Secondly, it is suggested that the arbitrators
in every instance decide the issue of fraud when raised, irrespective of the
remedy sought. This approach is valid if the arbitration agreement can be
considered as severable from the remainder of the contract. Separability can
be substantiated in two ways: (1) the very wording of the arbitration statutes
form a quid
makes it severable; 2T and (2) the mutual promises to arbitrate
28
pro quo, severing the agreement from the substantive contract.
In the leading federal case of Lawrence v. Devonshire Fabrics, nc.20 both
of these theories were discussed. The court held that an allegation of fraud
as to the substantive contract was properly to be decided by the arbitrators
provided for under the terms of the contract. Although damages were sought,
the court did not rely upon the affirmance of contract approach, but held the
arbitration agreement severable from the substantive contract. The court, in
dictum, intimated that the mutual promises to arbitrate might constitute a
sufficient consideration to render the agreement of arbitration severable from
the substantive contract. The court did not find it necessary to decide the case
on that ground. Rather, it derived separability from the wording of the Federal
Arbitration Act,30 construing the word "contract" as used therein to refer only
to the agreement to arbitrate and not as inclusive of the substantive contract.
Consequently, to avoid arbitration the fraud alleged would have to be directed
specifically against the arbitration agreement itself. Under the reasoning of
Lawrence, it is immaterial whether the innocent party seeks damages or
rescission. 3 ' The court in its decision alluded to the law of New York and stated
"that were we compelled to apply New York law to the problems involved in
this case, we would have been forced to arrive at a contrary conclusion. '8 2
It is submitted that under the precise facts of the Lawrence case New York
courts would have ordered arbitration, not on the separability theory but
rather on the affirmance of contract approach.
26. In the Matter of Amerotron Corp., 3 App. Div. 2d 899, 162 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1st
Dep't 1957), aff'd mem., 4 N.Y.2d 722, 148 N.E.2d 319, 171 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1958).
27. Comment, 36 Yale LJ. 866 (1927).
28. Nussbaum, The Separability Doctrine in American and Foreign Arbitration, 17
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 609 (1940).
29. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
30. Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
31. The court said that "in the view we take of the case before us it is immaterial
that Lawrence claims to have rescinded the contract and that Devonshire disputed this
claim and asserts that Lawrence by later inconsistent acts waived any right to rescind. We
say there was a valid agreement to arbitrate, that all there remains is to construe the
agreement and that the controversy over fraud in the inducement, whether Lawrence
affirmed or disaffirmed the contract and attempted to or did rescind it, is a 'complaint,
controversy or question' which arose 'with respect to this contract.'" 271 F.2d at 411.
32.

Id. at 412.
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The separability theory based on the contract approach of mutual promises
to arbitrate constituting an independent contract has to a great extent been
recognized in the courts of Europe, 33 but as yet has found only slight approbation in this country. Other than the dictum in Lrwrence, adherence to it
can be found only in one New York case. 4 It would seem that separability
on general principles of contract law cannot be maintained. Professor Williston
observes that as to a severable contract, the essential requirement is "that on
performance on one side of each of its successive divisions, the other party
becomes indebted for the agreed price of the division. ' 3 5 The essential test
as to a single contract is whether the parties assented to all the promises as a
single whole. The parties clearly do not think in terms of a severable contract
when they add an arbitration clause to a substantive contract. Lacking a
clear intention to the contrary, separability should not be presumed.
Obviously, the parties can always expressly provide that the agreement of
arbitration is severable. The same result would obtain if the agreement to
arbitrate was executed at a subsequent time. Corbin, in his treatise on contracts,
rejects separability:
[I]f the alleged defect exists, it affects the provision for arbitration just as much
as it affects the other provisions. Even if, for some purposes, the provision for arbi-

tration is declared to be independent and collateral, the factor that makes the rest
of the transaction void or voidable would affect that transaction as a whole. If one
party failed to express assent to the terms proposed by the other, no contract has,

been made. The proposal for arbitration lacks acceptance just as fully as do the
other proposed terms.3 6

It appears that the separability approach derived from the statute itself is
without merit. Assuming that the legislature in the enactment of the statutes
fully realized that agreements to arbitrate future disputes are almost invariablyappended to contracts of sale, if the intention was to have the term "contract"
refer only to the agreement of arbitration, all that was required would have
been to have the statute read "contract of arbitration." Under the rule that a
statute in derogation of the common law must be construed strictly, an arbitration statute should not be interpreted in such a manner as to make contracts
severable which were not such at common law.
CONCLUSION

All questions of voidability should be decided by arbitration if the parties
have so agreed, i.e., if the agreement by its terms is broad enough, irrespective
of whether the injured party seeks rescission or damages. The rule when
damages are sought is consistent with this view. As to rescission, however, the
cases have been to the contrary, although for various reasons there is indicated
33. Nussbaum, The Separability Doctrine in American and Foreign Arbitration, 17
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 609, 610 (1940).
34. In re Albert, N.Y.L.J., March 12, 1936, p. 1276 (Sup. CL).
35. 3 Williston, Contracts § 861 (rev. ed. 1936).
36. 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1444 (1951).
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a move in the other direction.37 The doctrine of separability is legally untenable, although clearly beneficial from a pragmatic standpoint. It is suggested
that the courts, as an alternative approach, consider the theory of estoppel.
Since rescission is an equitable remedy, it is subject to suit being timely brought
once the fraud is discovered. It can be argued that in a factual situation like
the Cheney case, the alleged defrauding party, having sought specific performance of the agreement to arbitrate prior to any action or notice by the
innocent party, has put himself in a position of reliance on the apparent validity
of the contract from which he should not be forced to retreat. This theory apparently formed the basis for one recent New York lower court decision.88 The
court there said that "no action has been instituted to rescind or cancel this
contract. The petitioner apparently did not question the validity until the
demand for arbitration was made, accepting, in the meantime, any benefits
arising from it. At this time the contract is valid, subsisting and binding upon
30
the petitioner."
The court, under this estoppel theory, should also consider as a necessary
prerequisite to recission whether the parties can be restored to their original
positions in light of performance already completed, both of the arbitration
agreement and the substantive contract. If the answer to either of these questions is in the negative, arbitration should be compelled.
Adoption of these basic considerations will not fully clear the way for
fraud to come within the scope of arbitration as a matter of course, for the
courts will still retain, in a great many instances, the determination of fraud
where, prior to any move by the alleged defrauding party, the innocent party
seeks rescission in a judicial tribunal. There at least the claim is usually better
40
founded and more colorable than when raised as a defense to arbitration.
To attain the most desirable situation wherein the arbitrators would determine
all issues of fraud would involve a change in the statutes. Meanwhile, the
simplest approach under existing law is for the parties to expressly provide
that the arbitration agreement is a severable contract or to include a specific
disclaimer in the contract against fraud in the inducement. Such a provision
was upheld in Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris.41 The parties were prevented
from alleging fraud for any reason since at the time of the contract they expressly denied the existence of any.
37. Lugay Frocks, Inc. v. Joint Bd. Dressmakers' Union, N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1958, p. 3
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 6 App. Div. 2d 1000, 177 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1st Dep't 1958); In re East
Meadow Sanitation Serv., Inc., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 25, 1958, p. 13 (Sup. Ct.).
38. In re East Meadow Sanitation Serv., Inc., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 25, 1958, p. 13 (Sup. Ct.).
39. Id. at 13.
40. It is interesting to note that in Cheney Bros. v. Joroco Dresses, Inc., 245 N.Y. 375,
157 N.E. 272 (1927), the court of appeals found the allegation of fraud to be untenable.
41. 5 N.Y.2d 317, 157 N.E.2d 597, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1959).

